Professor Singer Makes a Point

So here’s a question for the intellectually inclined: how far can thinking go in correcting moral disconnection? How much can we THINK our way to being good?

Philosopher Peter Singer famously used thought experiments that illustrate how our moral lives are not so much rooted, as we might imagine them to be, in a rational capacity to apply moral principles. Here’s how Professor Singer explained it:
"To challenge my students to think about the ethics of what we owe to people in need, I ask them to imagine that their route to the university takes them past a shallow pond. One morning, I say to them, you notice a child has fallen in and appears to be drowning. To wade in and pull the child out would be easy but it will mean that you get your clothes wet and muddy, and by the time you go home and change you will have missed your first class. I then ask the students: do you have any obligation to rescue the child? Unanimously, the students say they do. The importance of saving a child so far outweighs the cost of getting one’s clothes muddy and missing a class, that they refuse to consider it any kind of excuse for not saving the child. Does it make a difference, I ask, that there are other people walking past the pond who would equally be able to rescue the child but are not doing so? No, the students reply, the fact that others are not doing what they ought to do is no reason why I should not do what I ought to do. Once we are all clear about our obligations to rescue the drowning child in front of us, I ask: would it make any difference if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, but similarly in danger of death, and equally within your means to save, at no great cost – and absolutely no danger – to yourself? Virtually all agree that distance and nationality make no moral difference to the situation. I then point out that we are all in that situation of the person passing the shallow pond: we can all save lives of people, both children and adults, who would otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world – and overseas aid agencies like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at a distance. At this point the students raise various practical difficulties. Can we be sure that our donation will really get to the people who need it? Doesn’t most aid get swallowed up in administrative costs, or waste, or downright corruption? Isn’t the real problem the growing world population, and is there any point in saving lives until the problem has been solved? These questions can all be answered: but I also point out that even if a substantial proportion of our donations were wasted, the cost to us of making the donation is so small, compared to the benefits that it provides when it, or some of it, does get through to those who need our help, that we would still be saving lives at a small cost to ourselves – even if aid organizations were much less efficient than they actually are. I am always struck by how few students challenge the underlying ethics of the idea that we ought to save the lives of strangers when we can do so at relatively little cost to ourselves." (FULL ARTICLE HERE)
As a matter of rational principle, it doesn’t matter if the helpless person is half a pond away or an ocean away. If it’s evil to neglect to save a dying child when we could, and when the cost to ourselves is fairly minimal, then it is evil wherever that child may be, right?

But rational principle doesn’t actually get us to act to save others, much, does it? If we don't have the social emotions triggered by concrete humans nearby, moral principles don't carry a whole lot of weight.

Except for a few people like Jason Trigg.

Next: Jason Trigg?

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This is part 3 of 4 of "Why Not Evil?"
Next: Part 4: "The Trigg Response"
Previous: Part 2: "The Dark Side"
Beginning: Part 1: "Two Questions"

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